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Abstract
We examine the role of macroeconomic fluctuations, asset market liquidity, and
network structure in determining contagion and aggregate losses in a financial sys-
tem. Systemic instability is explored in a financial network comprising three dis-
tinct, but interconnected, sets of agents – domestic banks, international financial
institutions, and firms. Calibrating the model to advanced country banking sector
data, we obtain sensible aggregate loss distributions which are bimodal in nature.
We demonstrate how systemic crises may occur and analyze how our results are
influenced by firesale externalities and the feedback effects from curtailed lending
in the macroeconomy. We also illustrate the resilience of our model financial sys-
tem to stress scenarios with sharply rising corporate default rates and falling asset
prices.
JEL classification: C63, G01, G17, G21.
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1. Introduction
The complex and opaque nature of modern financial systems poses a consider-
able challenge for the analysis of systemic resilience. An intricate web of claims
and obligations links households and firms to a wide variety of financial intermedi-
aries such as banks, insurance companies, and hedge funds. The rapid development
of securitization and credit derivative markets has also made exposures between
agents difficult to assess and monitor. The global financial crisis of 2007–8 illus-
trates how intertwined the financial network has become, whilst also making clear
the potential for widespread losses and instability.
Recent efforts by central banks to measure and assess systemic risk have em-
phasized the important role played by network effects, firesale externalities, and
funding liquidity risk in financial stability.1 A general insight, highlighted by
Alessandri et.al (2009), is that these factors generate “fat tails” in the distribution
of aggregate losses for the banking system. This is consistent with recent analyti-
cal work which suggests that financial systems, like other complex networks, have
“tipping points”, display a “robust-yet-fragile” tendency – with sharp discontinu-
ities emerging following some unexpected shocks, with other shocks resulting in
benign effects (May et.al. (2008); May and Haldane (2011); Gai and Kapadia
(2010); Gai et.al (2011)).
IAn earlier version of this paper was circulated under the title, Complexity and Crises in Finan-
cial Systems. We are grateful to David Aikman, Dilek Bu¨lbu¨l, Andy Haldane, Simon Hall, Reimer
Ku¨hn, Myron Kwast, Paul Ormerod, Joe Pearlman, Gabriel Sterne and Martin Summer for helpful
comments and suggestions for improvement. The comments of participants at the GRETA Asso-
ciati CREDIT 2009 conference on Credit Risk, Financial Crises, and the Macroeconomy (Venice,
24-25 September, 2008), the Royal Economic Society Annual Conference (Guildford, 20-22 April
2009), the Money, Macro and Finance Research Group Conference on “Financial Stability and Trans-
mission of Credit Risk” (London, 21 May 2009), the Bank for International Settlements workshop
on Challenges in Banking Research (Basel, 28-29 May, 2009), the Econometric Society European
Congress (Barcelona, 23-27 August, 2009), The European Central Bank workshop on Recent Ad-
vances in Modelling Systemic Risk Using Network Analysis (Frankfurt am Main, 5 October, 2009),
the Conference on Post-Crisis Financial Sector Performance (Bangor, 23 June 2011) and seminar
participants at the Bank of England are also gratefully acknowledged.
IIThis paper represents the views of the authors and should not be thought to represent those of
the Bank of England, its Monetary Policy Committee, or its Financial Policy Committee members.
∗Corresponding author; kartik.anand@tu-berlin.de. KA acknowledges support of the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft through the Collaborative Research Center (Sonderforschungsbereich) SFB
649 on “Economic Risks”.
1See, for example, Elsinger et.al (2006) for the Austrian banking system, Aikman et.al (2009)
for the UK, and Gauthier et.al (2010) for Canada. Foglia (2009) provides a detailed overview
of systemic risk assessment models being developed by central banks. Cifuentes et.al (2005) and
Morris and Shin (2009) offer analytical accounts of firesale effects and funding liquidity risk.
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These central bank studies rely on highly detailed, and relatively static, balance
sheet data to establish precise linkages between banks in the domestic financial sys-
tem and to derive banking system losses. As such, their usefulness is constrained
when true linkages are not known (such as with credit risk transfer or off-balance
sheet activity) or when shocks strike financial players external to the core banking
system. The pre-defined balance sheet interlinkages in these models also precludes
analysis of how network structure matters for system resilience. The crisis has
emphasized how network linkages and interactions between banks are critical to
understanding systemic risk. And the growing importance of “stress testing” exer-
cises in the policy debate about financial stability points to the need for analyses
that help overcome such limitations.
In this paper, we set out a general framework to gauge systemic risk in cir-
cumstances when data about the reach of financial exposures is limited and shocks
are international in nature. We present a statistical model of a financial system in-
volving a diverse set of financial agents, namely domestic banks, domestic firms,
and international financial institutions. We calibrate the model to advanced coun-
try banking sector data to illustrate how macroeconomic fluctuations, asset market
liquidity and network structure interact to determine aggregate credit losses and
contagion. Although the calibration is deliberately broad-brush so as to emphasize
the qualitative nature of the results, we obtain plausible fat-tailed (bi-modal) aggre-
gate loss distributions and can quantify the size of the macroeconomic or financial
sector shock that may be necessary for system-wide failure to occur.
The model highlights how shocks are propagated through the direct interlink-
ages of claims and obligations amongst (and between) domestic banks and inter-
national financial institutions. But it also shows how defaults across the network
are amplified by asset fire sales and curtailed lending in the macroeconomy as
credit crunch effects take hold in the event of distress. In addition, we illustrate
how greater heterogeneity of bank balance sheets leads to more realistic outcomes,
characterized by the failure of some – but not all – banks in extreme scenarios.
We also demonstrate how the model can be used to “stress-test” the banking
system. We draw on some recent bank stress testing exercises to examine the con-
sequences for bank failure in our model. The results obtained are entirely illus-
trative and intended to demonstrate the usefulness of the framework. Specifically,
we consider a scenario in which the loss rate on corporate exposures of around
4.5 % and is accompanied by a 20 % fall in equity prices as a result of firesales.
Faced with such stress, approximately one quarter of our model banking system is
pushed into default. Our findings do not seem implausible given that we explicitly
take into account macroeconomic and fire sale effects, although the assumption
of 100 % loss-given-default (LGD) suggests this estimate sets an upper bound on
bank failures.
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Our analysis complements recent work that draws on techniques from network
science and statistical physics to study credit contagion and model credit risk losses
in banks’ portfolios (Giesecke and Weber (2004, 2006); Horst (2007); Hatchett
and Ku¨hn (2009); Gai and Kapadia (2010); May and Arinaminpathy (2010)).
But the networks in these models typically involve homogeneous agents – a firm
or a bank – and do not capture the twin effects of macroeconomic and firesale
feedbacks.
Our analysis also relates to the literature which seeks to obtain analytical valu-
ation results for complex portfolio credit derivatives by considering default corre-
lation and credit contagion among firms in a dynamic setting Errais et.al (2010);
Longstaff and Rajan (2008). In contrast to these papers, clearly specified bank
balance sheets are central to our approach, with bilateral linkages precisely defined
with reference to these. And our differing modelling strategy, which focuses on the
transmission of contagion along these links, reflects the greater structure embedded
in our network set-up.
In choosing to model the complexity of a heterogeneous financial system with
feedback effects, we have allowed relatively little role for behavior. Analytical
tractability precludes optimizing agents and strategic interactions. Although we al-
low for plausible “rules of thumb” that permit banks to curtail lending and dispose
assets in a firesale, the contagion process is mechanistic. The size and structure of
financial linkages is kept constant as default cascades develop. While this assump-
tion may be defensible in the midst of a rapidly developing crisis, it is clearly at
odds with recent work on financial networks (Leitner (2005); Castiglionesi and
Navarro (2007)) that builds upon the seminal contribution of Allen and Gale
(2000)2. The stylized nature of these models means, however, that they cannot
be used for systemic risk assessment. So our paper should be viewed as a very
preliminary first step towards an integrated model of systemic risk that both takes
complexity seriously and incorporates realistic behavioral responses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an informal discussion of
our approach and explains how shocks are propagated and amplified in a stylized
financial system comprising diverse agents. Section 3 describes model calibration
and discusses a novel approach to deriving the distributions of balance sheet ex-
posures in environments when data is unavailable. Section 4 presents the baseline
aggregate loss distribution obtained from stochastic simulations and considers how
liquidity risk and macroeconomic feedbacks might affect system stability. Section
5 presents an example of how the model can be used for a banking system stress
2See Allen and Babus (2008) for a survey of network-theoretic approaches to modelling financial
issues. Jackson (2008) provides detailed discussion of strategic behavior on networks.
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test. A final section concludes. Formal details of the model and a description of
how distributions of exposures are obtained from maximum entropy techniques are
presented in the appendices.
2. A stylized financial system and the transmission of shocks
The financial system in our model can be viewed as a core-periphery struc-
ture with three inter-connected layers – domestic banks, international banks and
firms. While we do not model lending to households in this structure, the frame-
work could easily be augmented to include a role for them in a similar way to the
treatment of firm.
A network of core domestic banks sits at the center of the system. A distin-
guishing feature of this group is that each bank interacts with all other banks, i.e.,
the (sub-) network of domestic banks is complete. This structure reflects the im-
portance of core banks within money markets and payment systems in national
financial structures3 .
Beyond this group of core banks lies a group of international banks, i.e., banks
operating in foreign countries and peripheral to the core domestic financial system.
Unlike domestic banks, the (sub-) network of international banks is incomplete and
exhibits a ‘small world’ property – each international bank interacts with institu-
tions in its immediate vicinity and only interacts with more distant institutions with
some probability. The sparseness of the links between international banks relative
to the complete network of domestic banks reflects the much greater diversity of
institutions in this sector, both in terms of activity and location. It is also consis-
tent with recent evidence from von Peter (2007) on the financial linkages between
international banking centers.
The outer-most layer of the financial system is comprised of firms in the econ-
omy. Firms are assumed not to lend to each other and do not own shares in one
another. They are, thus, not connected to each other in any way. This assumption
is made for tractability. Firms are, however, assigned an exogenous credit rating
(investment or speculative grade), are subject to common aggregate economy-wide
shocks, and exposed to the risk of restrictions in bank credit. The performance of
different firms across the economy is therefore correlated following a shock to the
financial system.
Although the three layers of the financial system are distinct, each group is
linked to the others. Domestic and international banks can lend to, and borrow
from, each other. They are also able to lend to, and own shares (direct investments)
3Our data on lending between domestic UK banks corroborates this assumptions.
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in, firms. The financial relationships across layers are modelled as random graphs.
In other words, entities belonging to different layers are linked to each other with
a given probability. These probabilities are independent between pairs of entities,
and the random links mean banks can differ in terms of lending to, and equity
holdings in, firms.
Figure 1 illustrates the financial system. Our use of random graph techniques
to model the interlinkages between different types of agent can be viewed as a
metaphor for the opacity and reach of modern financial instruments. Policymakers
frequently highlight the way in which financial innovation has enabled financial
intermediaries to ‘slice and dice’ credit risks to the peripheries of the financial
system (Bank of England (2007a); Trichet (2008)). The value of instruments such
as credit derivatives and their related exposures are difficult to monitor as a result,
justifying the probabilistic treatment adopted here.
As Figure 1 shows, banks and firms are represented as nodes in a network.
Although not illustrated, links between nodes reflect credit or equity relationships
and the network is directed, with incoming links representing assets (i.e., monies
owed to an entity by a counterparty or shares in the case of banks’ relationships
with firms) and outgoing links representing liabilities. Figure 2 presents the typ-
ical balance sheet of a bank in the financial system. Total assets comprise loans
to firms, loans to other banks (domestic and international), shares in firms, and
government securities. The liability side of the balance sheet includes customer
deposits, interbank borrowing, and the bank’s capital buffer. Our balance sheet
structure is sufficiently simple to be tractable whilst including enough granularity
to be interesting.
Appendix A provides a formal presentation of the model. It specifies banks’
balance sheets and shows how our assumptions about connectivity allow the finan-
cial system described above to be cast in convenient matrix form. It also specifies
how shocks give rise to crisis dynamics and contagion.
An informal sense of the mapping from shocks to systemic risk can, however,
be readily gleaned from Figure 3. Macroeconomic disturbances can trigger firm
defaults, leading to credit losses and losses on holdings of firm equities at some
banks. These shocks can trigger the default of a financial institution and generate
a default cascade amongst banks that are directly linked4. But as the losses at an
individual bank mount, approaching a critical fraction of capital, it is also likely to
take defensive action to try to protect itself from failure. Specifically, it is likely to
4Alternatively, a financial institution may fail for idiosyncratic reasons without there being a
macroeconomic shock.
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sell assets (equities) once in distress and cut back on its lending to firms5. The fire-
sale of equities and resultant asset price decline gives rise to mark-to-market losses,
forcing other banks to write down the value of their assets and potentially enter into
their own fire sales and tighten their own lending to firms. Meanwhile restrictions
in credit increase the probability probability of default of firms, magnifying the
initial shock. Direct contagion is, thus, reinforced by firesales and macroeconomic
feedback effects.
We strictly assume that the banking sector is the sole provider of credit for firms
who do not have direct access to credit markets or any other channel of credit. Our
focus and assumption is a stylized attempt to capture macroeconomic feedback
loops from the financial system to the real economy. Moreover, one may expect
our assumption to be qualitatively true during periods of financial crisis, where
due to a confluence of high capital search costs and a hoarding of liquidity by
all institutions, i.e., a credit crunch, the probability of default for firms increases,
which exacerbates the financial crisis.
In the mechanistic setting adopted here, banks follow rules of thumb when con-
fronted with distress. Although plausible, these rules have no micro-foundations.
But they can be viewed as being consistent with rational behavior. Facing a highly
uncertain recovery rate and timing of economic recovery in the midst of crisis,
banks are likely to assume a worst case scenario and be willing to pull credit lines.
For simplicity we do not assume an explicit link between a fall in equity prices and
the default probabilities of firms. These channels are subsumed with other behav-
ioral factors that collectively raise the credit risks of firms. If such loans are denied
the firm defaults on existing loans to other banks, thereby exacerbating the crisis.
3. Model calibration
We attempt to characterize the state of a modern financial system prior to the
onset of the global financial crisis. Although we draw upon UK data for much of
our calibration, our choice of parameters is intended to be purely illustrative and
does not purport to quantify systemic risk in the UK. Our intention, instead, is
to showcase how the model can usefully generate plausible measures of systemic
risk and clarify the interplay between macro-financial shocks, market liquidity,
and network structure within a financial system. Since some of the exposure data
5Our approach does not model the dynamic restructuring of balance sheets. In other words, the
actual transfer of equity from one bank to another as a result of the firesale is absent. We motivate this
stylized assumption by qualifying our firesale as an anticipated firesale. Once a bank’s capital falls
below the critical threshold, all other market participants will anticipate that the bank will perform a
firesale in the near future. It is this anticipation that results in the fall of equity prices.
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is confidential in nature, we verbally describe how we calibrate some of the key
statistics necessary for our maximum entropy procedure. These exposure statistics
are, however, reported in detail where the data is publicly available.
The network consists of 17 domestic banks, 240 international banks, and 50,000
firms. Seventeen domestic-owned banks accounted for 95 % of banking assets in
the UK at end-2007, while three-quarters of foreign exchange turnover during 2004
was accounted for by some 240 non-UK banks located in 20 countries the Bank for
International Settlements (2008) ‘Consolidated Banking Statistics Report’, which
publishes aggregate statistics on cross-border loans and explicitly excludes non-
bank financial entities such as insurance agencies and hedge funds. Our choice of
the number of firms is based on the UK’s Department for Business Innovation and
Skills press release on Small and Medium Enterprise Statistics. At the beginning
of 2008 they recorded approximately 33,000 firms in the UK with 50 employees
or more. Our choice of 50,000 firms is broadly illustrative of this statistic. Clearly,
the number of foreign financial institutions and firms can be much larger, so our
choice simply indicates the situation facing an economy with a highly developed
and integrated financial sector.
Given the paucity of data about exposures between banks internationally, and
between domestic firms and international banks, we rely on deriving distributions
of exposure sizes and the number of links between the three types of agent from
a limited data set. We use quarterly time series data on balance sheets over a
four year horizon (2004-2007) to fit least biased distributions. These establish the
financial connections of our network. Appendix B shows how empirical constraints
observed in the data are accounted for in selecting a least biased distribution that
also maximizes information content.
A novel feature of the calibration is our use of the principle of maximum en-
tropy to estimate the distributions of exposures between financial players. Specifi-
cally, we use the principle of maximum entropy to approximate the empirical dis-
tribution of exposures. The entropy, which is a function of the probability distri-
bution, is a measure of the predictability of exposures. When the entropy is large,
there is greater uncertainty on our current state of knowledge and it is harder to
predict typical exposure values. In this case, the distribution of exposures is broad.
On the other hand, when the entropy is small, the distribution is sharply peaked
around a small range of exposures, thereby improving the predictability. The prin-
ciple of maximum entropy postulates that subject to known constraints (knowledge
of the first few moments from the empirical distribution, for example), the probabil-
ity distribution that best represents our current knowledge and that is least biased
is the one with maximal entropy. Importantly, the principle does not require the
modeler to make prior assumptions on the shape of the probability distribution.
We implement our maximum entropy procedure using the algorithm provided by
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Mohammad-Djafari (1991).
Our approach is distinct from the maximum entropy methods used in central
bank analyses (eg Elsinger et.al (2006); Upper (2011)). These studies estimate re-
alizations of exposure matrices whose entropy is as close as possible to a reference
matrix. The entropy here is a function of the exposure matrices themselves, which
have been suitably re-scaled to satisfy properties of probability distributions.
3.1. Structure of balance sheets
We use end-2007 published accounts data for the 17 UK banks and correspond-
ing data for international banks reported in BankScope to characterize the balance
sheets used in the model. The average total asset size for UK and international
banks are £ 400 bn and £ 150 bn respectively. For UK banks, equities, loans to
firms and interbank assets (the sum of claims against both foreign and other UK
banks) made up 10 %, 80 % and 10 % of assets respectively, on average. The data
from Bankscope suggest a similar picture for international banks’ balance sheets,
so we adopt the same composition for these balance sheets as well.
3.2. Distribution of exposure sizes between banks
We calibrate the distribution of interbank loans between domestic (UK) banks
using confidential quarterly data on regulatory large exposures for the 17 major
banks between 2004-2007. The empirical mean, standard deviation and skewness
for the bilateral claims between UK banks were calculated and form the constraints
in calculating the maximum entropy PDF. Figure 4 plots the maximum entropy
PDF (solid line) against actual data (circles) on a Y-logarithmic scale.6 For com-
parison, we also plot a fitted log normal distribution (dashed line). Both the maxi-
mum entropy and log-normal distributions fit the empirical distribution fairly well.
To establish the distribution of loan sizes between domestic and international
banks, we suppose that the 240 banks originate from the 20 most financially ad-
vanced countries for which data is readily available in the Bank for International
Settlements (2008), ‘Consolidated Banking Statistics Report’. We use this infor-
mation to establish the sterling claims of UK banks on other countries’ banking
systems and vice versa. We assume that all international banking claims are chan-
neled through the 17 core domestic banks and the 8 international banks in each
foreign country. We approximate the individual bank-to-bank claims by dividing
the aggregated claims of all domestic banks by the number of UK banks (17) and
the number of international banks per country (12).
6The PDF for the actual data was obtained by binning the bilateral exposures and normalizing the
weight attributed to each bin. The circles in Figure 4 correspond to bin centers.
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Empirical means, standard deviations and skewness statistics were also calcu-
lated for claims held by UK banks against international banks. For those held by
international banks against UK banks, the mean, standard deviation and skewness
were £ 0.28 bn, £ 0.67 bn, and 4.56. Figure 4 plots the maximum entropy and
fitted log-normal PDFs of loans sizes between international and domestic banks.
There is again reasonable agreement between the actual and fitted PDFs, although
the maximum-entropy PDF seems to capture the fat tailed nature of the distribution
somewhat better.
The international banks in our system, of course, also lend to each other as well
as to banks within their own jurisdictions. Data on interbank lending within foreign
banking systems is not available, however. So we suppose that each international
bank lends to ten of its local counter-parties7 and that lending between these banks
follows the same statistics as interbank lending within the UK.
In order to calibrate the distribution of exposure sizes between international
banks in different countries, we make use of cross-border claims data from the
BIS. The mean, standard deviation, and skewness of each exposure is £ 0.25 bn, £
0.81 bn, and 6.84 respectively. The fitted maximum entropy distribution in Figure
4 provides a reasonable description of the data, including the fatness in the tail.
3.3. Connections between banks
In addition to exposure sizes, we also need to establish the number of links
between banks to construct the financial network. To obtain the maximum entropy
distribution for the number of links that a bank has against other banks, we use
the results of Bianconi (2009) that for uncorrelated networks, the maximum en-
tropy distribution for the number of links is a Poisson distribution. Uncorrelated
networks are those where the degrees of nodes are not correlated. To argue that
our financial network may be modeled by an uncorrelated network we assume that
domestic banks are owned by domestic shareholders only. If, on the other hand,
domestic banks were owned by international shareholders, this would lead to bias
in the structure of links between domestic and foreign banks. This assumption
holds for our selection of core UK banks.And since we do not know the identities
of the other international banks, our assumption serves as a null hypothesis for the
structure of linkages.
To construct this distribution for our financial system, we need the average
number of links between agents – banks or firms – of type X against those of type
Y, denoted 〈cXY〉. This implies that the probability that any link is present between
7As made clear below, to utilize the ‘small-world’ network algorithm of Watts and Strogatz
(1998) the number of local counter-parts for each international bank must be even.
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two banks is pXY = 〈c
XY 〉
NY , where N
Y is the total number of banks of type Y. So
the problem reduces to estimating the average number of links between the various
types of banks.
We take the domestic banking network as being completely connected. The
average number of connections for claims held by domestic banks against inter-
national banks is obtained by taking the average total interbank assets of a UK
bank, subtracting the average total assets held against other UK banks, and divid-
ing by the average size of an exposure between a UK and international bank. This
suggests that each domestic (UK) bank is exposed to 52 international banks.
To establish connections between international banks, we assume that each in-
ternational bank is connected, on average, to 4 domestic UK banks. In this case, the
fraction of domestic UK banks each foreign bank has loans with (4/17) is roughly
equal to the fraction of foreign banks each domestic UK bank has loans against
(52/240). Each international bank lends to ten other banks in its own country. We
model the network of all international banks as a ‘small world’ network, where
each international bank is linked to those in immediate proximity (banks in the
same country) and has occasional ‘long range’ connections to other international
banks. The means that the number of ‘immediate-neighbor’ connections (between
international banks in the same country) is 2κ = 10. We obtain the average num-
ber of ‘long range’ connections by taking average total interbank assets (10 % of
£ 150 bn), subtracting the average assets held against domestic UK banks (4× £
0.28 bn) and those held against other banks in the same country, and dividing this
quantity by the average size of an exposure between international banks in different
countries (£ 0.25 bn). This gives approximately 7 ‘long range’ connections. Defin-
ing the ‘long-range’ wiring probability as p, the average degree for each node is
2κ(1 + p), implying that p = 0.7.
As Figure 5 illustrates, we arrange the nodes of international banks in a ring,
connecting each to its immediate (local) neighbors, and then randomly (with prob-
ability p) allowing an international bank to form connections with another bank in-
ternationally that is chosen from a uniform distribution over all international banks.
This procedure is iterated over all international banks.
3.4. Distribution of loans to firms and equity holdings
In the absence of data on individual bank lending to firms, we use our break-
down of banks’ balance sheets to suppose that each loan and equity holding is, on
average, £ 100 mil and £ 10 mil, respectively for UK banks and £ 12 mil and £
1.2 mil for international banks. The data on average balance sheet size and con-
tributions from loans and equities allows us to infer the connections between do-
mestic (D) and international banks (I) and firms (F). These are 〈cDF〉 = 3200 and
〈cIF〉 = 3200 for loans, and 〈dDF〉 = 4000 and 〈dIF〉 = 4000 for equities.
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3.5. Corporate default probabilities
Our calibration of corporate sector default probabilities is based on a study of
US investment and speculative grade firms by Schuermann and Hanson (2004).
They use credit rating data from Standard and Poors over the period 1981-2002
to establish Gaussian density functions for annual default probabilities in each
grade. We base our default probabilities upon these parameterized density func-
tions. Specifically, we treat the default probability in investment (A) grade cat-
egory as having a mean and standard deviation of 〈PDIG〉 = 8.65 × 10−5 and
σIG = 2 × 10−5, respectively. The non-investment grade (BB) category has a
mean and standard deviation of 〈PDNIG〉 = 6.3 × 10−3 and σNIG = 6.1 × 10−4,
respectively. The proportion of firms that are investment grade (speculative grade)
within the system is 0.7 (0.3). We take the firm LGD to be 35%.
The probabilities of default for all firms are also influenced by an common
economy wide shock µG. The larger µG, indicating a worsening of the macroeco-
nomic outlook, the higher are the probabilities of default for all firms, irrespective
of their rating grade. We do not calibrate µG, instead we use it as variable in or-
der to explore how large a macroeconomic shock needs to be in order to “tip” the
financial system into a systemic crisis.
3.6. Additional parameters
Our model also makes use of some additional parameters that are critical in de-
termining the extent of feedback effects following a shock to the financial network.
Specifically,
• Ratio of capital to assets (leverage ratio), π : we initially set banks’ (un-
weighted) capital buffers to be a uniform π = 4% of total assets, a figure
drawn from the 2005 published accounts of a range of large international
banks. We then allow capital buffers to vary across banks in the range
[4− 24]%. In section 4.4, we relax the assumption of uniform capital buffers
allowing them to vary in the range [4 − 24]%.
• Trigger rule for firesales, α : once a banks’ losses from the combined effects
of corporate defaults, mark to market losses on its equities, and interbank
losses amount to 50 % of its initial capital buffer, the bank will decide to put
its own tradeable assets up for sale. This trigger level of 50% amounts to
setting the parameter α = 0.5.
• Liquidity discount parameter, λ : we set λ = 0.7 to reflect the fact that
once 10 % of equity is put up for sale, the equity price q(t) will fall by 7%.
Our parameterization of the price impact of a firesale is, to a large extent,
12
arbitrary since evidence on the price impact of firesales is scarce. Mitchell
et.al (2007) analyze firesales of US convertible bonds by hedge funds in
2005, and suggest that price discounts were around 3 % when some 5 % of
the market was sold. This would correspond to a value of λ = 0.57 in our
model. Given this estimate is based upon a period of relatively low stress in
the financial system, we adopt a value for λ consistent with a more significant
price impact.
• Macroeconomic feedback parameter, ψ : since macroeconomic feedback ef-
fects in the current crisis are yet to be properly calibrated, we (somewhat
arbitrarily) set φ = 6.25 × 10−5 as a working hypothesis. This implies, fairly
plausibly, that if a bank reduces the volume of credit it issues to firms by 20%
this will increase the probability of default for all firms that have preexisting
loans against the bank equally, irrespective of whether the bank is domestic
or international. Specifically, we set ψ = 0.2/
(
〈cDF 〉+〈cIF 〉
2
)
. Thus, if all banks
have more loans, on average, the impact of one bank tightening its’ credit
conditions is mapped into a smaller rise in the probability of default of firms.
The trigger rule for a bank to tighten lending conditions is identical to that
for firesales and is governed by the ratio α of losses to the capital buffer.
4. Credit events, aggregate losses, and feedback effects
We now present a plausible aggregate loss distribution for the calibrated finan-
cial system and evaluate its response to adverse credit shocks. Standard industry
models of systemic risk do not consider the complexity implied by international
financial linkages and are typically limited in their characterization of the feedback
effects from asset firesales and tightening credit conditions in the macroeconomy.
The extent to which these factors combine to generate fat tails in the aggregate
loss distribution is critical to the assessment of financial system resilience. In what
follows, we assume a zero recovery rate on loans. This stark assumption is made
for tractability and to highlight our findings, but can be readily relaxed without
affecting the spirit of the results. Given both this and the broad-brushed nature of
the more general calibration, the results presented below should be taken as purely
illustrative rather than as a precise measure of systemic risk in the financial system.
4.1. The baseline aggregate loss distribution
We perform a series of stochastic simulations to obtain an aggregate loss distri-
bution under a set of baseline assumptions. Specifically, we assume that asset fire-
sales have no price impact and that there are no macroeconomic feedback effects
(λ = ψ = 0). There are also no aggregate macroeconomic shocks to firms (µG = 0).
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For each simulation, we generate balance sheets where exposures are drawn from
the connectivity and asset size distributions described in Section 3. Next, through
a series of Bernoulli trials, we set some of the firms to default. These defaults are
registered on banks’ balance sheets, possibly prompting defaults or firesales. Once
the shock has run its course through the network and asset prices have adjusted,
we measure the fraction of failed banks and the balance sheets of all banks in the
system. We perform 1000 such simulations and create a distribution for banking
system assets lost.
The inset of Figure 6 presents the normalized histogram for the number of de-
faulting firms from the initial credit shock. The number of failures from subjecting
firms to a shock is characterized by a Bernoulli distribution function (see descrip-
tion in Appendix A.4). The typical defaulting firm is small in relation to the overall
financial system – the average size of a defaulting firm is 0.003% of total system
assets. In the baseline, 150 firms default on average in each simulation.
Figure 6 presents the aggregate loss distribution for the banking system, as a
fraction of total banking system assets, for the domestic bank network and the over-
all financial system. The idiosyncratic defaults on the scale described above have
very little impact on system resilience – there are no bank defaults. Average sys-
tem losses as a result of the idiosyncratic shocks are some 0.17 % of the domestic
banking system and 0.16 % of the overall system. In other words, both domes-
tic and international banks are similarly affected following idiosyncratic corporate
failures.
4.2. Macroeconomic shocks
Aggregate macroeconomic shocks to the financial system have an adverse ef-
fect on firms and enter the model via the parameter, µG, the increase of which
reflects higher levels of firm default.
We begin by attempting to identify the scale of firm default, absent any feed-
back effects from firesales or a credit crunch, that triggers the first instances of
complete financial system failures (i.e the failure of all domestic and international
banks). The results reported for each µG are compiled from performing 500 draws
of the shock and letting them run their course through the system. The initial in-
stance of system-wide failure occurs at µcG = 0.078. This point is depicted in Figure
7 by a downward facing triangle, and is associated with the default of 2700 firms
on average. For µG < µcG, we only observe cases where at most one international
bank fails. At µcG, by contrast, we observe that there are no bank failures 99.5 % of
the time, one bank failing 0.1 % of the time, and in the remainder 0.4 % of cases
the entire system fails. In these instances of complete network failure, the initial
macroeconomic shock reduces the capital buffer for banks holding loans and equity
against the defaulting firms, triggering the direct failure of a few banks. Interbank
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linkages then lead to direct contagion, as the similarity among banks in their abil-
ity to absorb shocks leads to a starkly bi-polar result in which all banks fail once
widespread contagion has broken out. At the critical value µcG, the loss distribution
becomes bimodal for the first time.
Figure 7 also shows the average fraction of failed banks (solid line with squares)
as a function of µG. Due to the assumed homogeneity in banks’ ability to withstand
shocks, each square represents the probability the financial system will collapse for
a given level of macroeconomic shock. As µG approaches 0.09,the probability of
system failure accelerates towards unity. There is an inflection point associated
with µG ≈ 0.085. Here, the probability mass is equally distributed between the
two modes of the aggregate loss distribution, representing the ‘phase transition’ or
‘tipping point’ of the complex financial system. For macroeconomic shocks above
this level, the financial system will always collapse.
Figure 8 plots the aggregate loss distribution for the entire banking system for
the stressed scenario where µG = 0.078. As can be seen, the losses under the
adverse scenario are orders of magnitude greater than those in the baseline and
the distribution is bi-modal. The probability mass is concentrated around (a) small
losses of around 3 % of system assets; and (b) a few extreme instances where
around 11 % of system assets are lost. In these extreme cases, the entire financial
system collapses.
4.3. Feedback effects
We now investigate the effects of asset firesales and the withdrawal of bank
lending to firms on the aggregate loss distribution. When banks are in distress and
losses mount in excess of a trigger threshold, α, of their capital buffer, they sell
their holdings of equities and simultaneously tighten their lending to firms. The
withdrawal of credit from remaining firms increases their probability of default.
As further credit losses mount, the feedback effects of reduced bank lending am-
plifies the losses to banks and, together with the mark-to market effects of firesales,
contributes to further financial instability.
We initially focus on the pure macroeconomic feedback effect of a credit crunch
and abstract away from the possibility of any distress fire sales. In this case, λ = 0.
Thus, with ψ = 6.25 × 10−5, we find no shift in the tipping point µcG = 0.078.
However, as figure 7 indicates the average fraction of failed banks is higher, as
indicated by an upward shift of the curve in figure 9. In the case of pure firesale
effect, i.e., ψ = 0, figure 9 shows the with λ = 0.7, the minimum critical quantum
of credit risk necessary to instigate system collapse is brought forward sharply to
µcG = 0.037. The average fraction of failed banks again shows the probability of
system-wide failure.
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Allowing for the possibility that banks tighten credit conditions once they opt
to engage in firesales further brings forward the first instance of system failure.
Our calibration suggests that µcG = 0.031 in this case and, as Figure 9 shows,
the probability of system failure is greater for all values of µG. The intuition is
straightforward. In the first round, the tightening of credit by banks pushes further
firms into bankruptcy, amplifying the extent of credit losses among banks. The
ensuing distress of some banks leads to further firesales and a second round of
credit tightening that further raises the probability of firm default. The cycle only
terminates once the entire banking system fails.
As our results make clear, macroeconomic feedbacks are less substantial than
firesales in our calibration. Indeed, both are difficult to calibrate meaningfully.
While our firesale calibration is based on Mitchell et.al (2007), our ability to cal-
ibrate the macroeconomic feedbacks is wayward. While it may well be that this
feedback is more substantial, the combined effects of both the firesale and macroe-
conomic feedbacks appear plausible. A through calibration of these mechanisms
is beyond the scope of this paper and is an avenue for future analysis.
4.4. A more realistic setting - heterogeneity of capital buffers
Our depiction of financial fragility has been extremely stark – a change in the
size of a credit shock around a critical value determines whether the entire network
collapses or not. More realistically, one might expect situations in which interme-
diate outcomes obtain, in which only some banks fail but the rest of the system
continues to function. In particular, shocks may be unable to spread once they
reach very well capitalized banks.
We therefore relax the assumption that all banks have the same capital buffer,
and allow it to vary from institution to institution. The capital-asset ratio, π, is now
drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0.04, 0.24], more representative
of the sort of buffers likely to be held by banks in some countries.
Figure 10 depicts a much richer set of results. We note, for example, that
for µG = 0.0375, on average 2.8 % of banks default. The banks that fail are
both foreign and domestic. In particular instances of the simulations, 219 banks
collapsed (85 % of the the total system), while the few remaining, by virtue of
higher capital buffers are saved. As µG increases to 0.0475 a similar conclusion
is drawn. On average 91 % or 234 banks in the system collapses. Once again,
a few banks are found to be sufficiently well capitalized to survive the shock and
feedback effects.
The highest default rates between 1920 and 2006 were, 1.7 % for investment
grade – ratings class A – firms and 11.1 % for speculative grade – ratings class Ba –
firms. (Moody’s (2007)). These higher default rates were witnessed, in particular,
during the Great Depression, which was a period of significant bank failures. In our
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model, these figures correspond to a probability of default for the average of 4.5
%, which is generated by taking µG = 0.045. With liquidity and macro-feedback
effects switched on and allowing banks to have heterogenous levels of capital in
our model, we find that with µG = 0.045 a significant fraction (89 %) of the entire
banking system collapses, on average.
5. “Stress testing”
In the wake of the global financial crisis, policy-makers have begun to subject
banking systems to “stress tests”. While we cannot do full justice to such exer-
cises, out model is well versed to provide a compelling caricature of these tests
that include both macroeconomic feedback and asset firesales. Moreover, our use
of a random graph structure sidesteps the challenge to regulators of assessing the
true scale of network connections due to complex financial products.
Specifically, we may ask how well domestic banks absorb corporate exposure
loss rates of around 4.5 % (µG = 0.044) and a 35 % haircut of equity exposures
stemming from a 20 % equity price fall (λ = 0.37). These are the sorts of shocks
being considered by policy-makers in contemporary bank stress test exercises.
Under this scenario we find that there are no bank failures in 67 % of the
simulated instances. However, in the remainder 33 % of cases we have, on average,
200 (78 %) foreign and domestic banks failing. This implies that an overall average
of 25 % of banks fails. In the instances where no banks default, the losses solely
due to corporate defaults amount to 1.8 % of total system assets. However, in the
remainder of instances, we have, on average 19 % of all assets being wiped out.
The high average percentage of bank failures may be attributed to key modeling
assumptions in our model, specifically the inclusion of macroeconomic and firesale
feedback loops. These elements exacerbate shocks to the banking system, as dis-
cussed in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, thereby heightening the fragility of the financial
system. Secondly, we take a 100% LGD on interbank exposures. This assumption
is stark and intended to be purely illustrative. Actual LGDs are likely to be less8.
Taking, as we do, a loss rate of 100 % amplifies losses due to bank defaults, which
further contributes to the degradation of systemic stability. Finally, a third exacer-
bating factor is that we do not allow banks to offset their losses by future expected
earnings, which would have helped mitigate the cascade of failures.
8For instance, published results on loss rates (e.g. James (1991)), report a loss rate of 40% for
banks. Relatedly, Altman and Kishore (1996) estimate the recovery rates (100-LGD %) on defaulting
bonds of financial institutions between 1978-1995 to be about 36 %, on average. However, recovery
rates vary by type of institution: mortgage banks 68 %, finance companies, 46 % and commercial
banks, 29 %.
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6. Conclusion
Modern financial systems are characterized by complex interlinkages and a di-
verse set of agents. Our paper develops a general framework to gauge systemic
stability in the presence of such linkages and heterogeneity. Calibrating the model
using data on advanced country banking sector that is largely public, we illustrate
how macroeconomic fluctuations, asset market liquidity, and network structure in-
teract to determine aggregate credit losses and contagion. Although our calibra-
tion is broad-brush in nature to emphasize the qualitative results of the model, the
results show how systemic stability might begin to be quantified in a statistical
fashion, particularly when data about the reach of modern financial instruments is
limited and shocks are international in nature.
A thorough understanding of both the qualitative and quantitative features of
aggregate loss distributions in the banking system is important for policymakers
concerned with systemic risk. Our findings indicate that macroeconomic shocks
and asset price feedback effects intertwine to generate fat tails in these distributions
and that large-scale financial disruption may be possible. We also show how the
heterogeneity of bank balance sheets gives rise to more realistic situations in which
some banks fail, but the overall system remains resilient.
The model clearly illustrates how complex financial systems are vulnerable to
system-wide breakdown of the type observed during the recent global financial
crisis. It can also be used to inform stress testing exercises. Drawing on the types
of scenarios and shocks recently used by policymakers to gauge financial sector
resilience, we find the model generates outcomes that are broadly plausible. In
particular, the default rates in the corporate sector necessary to trigger a systemic
financial event in the model are comparable to those witnessed during the Great
Depression and also the recent crisis.
Our model imposes a number of simplifying restrictions on connectivity. Re-
laxing these restrictions and altering the topology of the network may affect risk-
sharing and change the degree to which shocks are dispersed safely across the
financial system. A thorough evaluation of changing the network linkages between
and among different types of agent is a task we leave for future research. An even
greater challenge is to incorporate more meaningful behavioral responses into this
type of network model, whilst retaining the complexities in its structure.
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A. A Statistical Model of the Financial System
A.1. Financial relationships between different types of agent
The financial system consists of N agents who belong to one of three types:
(1) ND domestic banks; (2) N I international banks and (3) NF firms9, where N =
ND + N I + NF .
Each agent is represented by a node on a directed graph and linked to each other
through their assets, liabilities, and equity holdings. Specifically, for an agent i, an
incoming link from agent j represents an asset – either loans or equities – on i’s
balance sheet. Let the value of loans and equities from agent i to j be Ai j, Qi j ∈ R+
respectively. Outgoing links represent an agent’s liabilities with value Li j ∈ R+.
Connections between agents of different types are formed randomly. The vari-
ables ci j, di j ∈ {0, 1} denote whether agent i holds a loan or equity assets against
agent j. Thus, we write
Ai j = ci jS i j , (1)
and
Qi j = di jTi j , (2)
where S i j, Ti j ∈ R+ are random variables that describe the extent of the exposure.
The statistics of our random variables are governed by the type of the lending
and borrowing agents, i.e., whether one or the other is a domestic or international
bank or a firm. We define ρDI(S i j) as the probability density function (PDF) of
loans from domestic bank, labeled i, to the international bank, labeled j. Similarly,
we can define the PDF ρIF(Ti j) of equity holdings between the international bank i
and firm j. Considering all possible combinations of agent types, and hence lending
arrangements, the statistics for sizes of loan and equity holdings is governed by 18
different probability distributions.
For the connectivity coefficients ci j and di j as well we can apply a similar pro-
cedure to define ρ˜DI(ci j) as the probability mass function (PMF) for the presence
(or absence) of a loan from domestic bank i to foreign bank j. Similarly, ρ˜IF(di j)
defines the PMF determining the probability with which international bank i holds
equity of firm j in our financial system. The financial relationships between differ-
ent types of agent can now be given a convenient matrix form. Their interactions
are summarized by the matrix
F =

ADD ADI ADF
AID AII AIF
AFD AFI AFF
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
QDD QDI QDF
QID QII QIF
QFD QFI QFF
 , (3)
9We furthermore denote by ND, N I and NF the set of domestic banks, international banks and
firms, respectively.
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where AXY and QXY are matrices of exposures from type X agents to other type
Y agents, whose elements are ci j S i j and di j Ti j, respectively, with i ∈ NX and
j ∈ NY .
The forms used for our exposure PDFs and connectivity PMFs is spelt out in
the calibration section.
A.2. Financial relationships between agents of the same type
We here assume that all core domestic banks holds assets against every other
domestic bank. Hence in matrix ADD we have that ci j = 1. This forms a complete
network of the core banks through their lending relationships. Firms do not hold
assets or equity against each other or against domestic and international banks.
Hence the matrices AFD ,AFI ,AFF ,QFD ,QFI and QFF are all equal to zero.
Interactions between international banks take place on a small-world network.
Such networks are characterized by (i) their clustering coefficient, which reflects
the clique-like relationship between a node and its nearest neighbors; (ii) long-
range links between ‘distant’ nodes which result in a short average path length (i.e.
a short average number of links between any two nodes).
The connectivity coefficients between international banks, i.e., ci j, with i, j ∈
N I , are constructed using the algorithm proposed by Watts and Strogatz (1998).
Pictorially, we arrange the nodes of international banks in a ring and connect each
node to its’ 2κ nearest neighbors. Next, starting with the first bank, we add with
probability p a ‘long-range’ link to another bank outside its’ nearest-neighborhood.
We perform this random draw and ‘long-range’ link addition with probability p a
total of 2κ times for the first bank. This procedure is iterated over all international
banks. The total number of ‘long-range’ links is N I 2κ p.
Taken together, our assumptions on connectivity lead to a restricted matrix and
imply that our financial system can be represented as
F′ =
(
ADD ADI ADF
AID AII AIF
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Q
DF
QIF
)
. (4)
A.3. Bank balance sheets
We now describe the bank balance sheets depicted in Figure formally. The total
assets of bank i, which may be either domestic or foreign, is
Ai =
∑
j∈NDi
S i j +
∑
j∈N Ii
S i j +
∑
j∈NFi
S i j +
∑
j∈MFi
Ti j + Bi , (5)
where
NXi = { j ∈ NX \ i | ci j = 1} andMFi = { j ∈ NF \ i | di j = 1} , (6)
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and Bi denotes the level of safe assets such as government bonds. The set NXi
denotes the set of institutions j (type X) against whom bank i holds an asset. Simi-
larly, MXi denotes the set of firms j whose shares bank i owns. The total liabilities
are
Li =
∑
j ∈ ˜NDi
S ji +
∑
j∈ ˜N Ii
S ji + Ki + Di , (7)
where Di denotes external liabilities such as customer deposits and the initial cap-
ital buffer Ki = π Ai is a fixed fraction π ∈ (0, 1) of assets on the balance sheet. As
before, ˜NXi = { j ∈ NX \ i | c ji = 1} denotes the set of banks j (type X) to whom
bank i has a liability.
If the initial assets of each bank drawn from the asset distribution exceeds ini-
tial liabilities, the liability-side of the balance sheet is ‘topped’ up by customer
deposits to ensure that total assets are equal to total liabilities. Conversely, if lia-
bilities exceed assets, the difference is accounted for on the asset side by holdings
of government bonds.
A.4. Crisis dynamics and contagion
In our simulations, a bank will default if its total losses are greater than its
capital buffer. We consider a two-state model, i.e., during each instance of the in-
ternal simulation time t ∈ N, bank i is either solvent (νi(t) = 0) or it has defaulted
(νi(t) = 1). Defining the total losses incurred by bank i as Li,tot(t) ≥ 0, we obtain
the following update rule:
νi(t + 1) = Θ (Li,tot(t) − Ki) , (8)
where Θ(. . .) is the Heaviside function. In what follows, we specify the various
components that contribute to bank losses.
A crisis is instigated by shocks to firms. We model firm default using a Bernoulli
model, of the sort widely used in the credit risk literature (Gordy (2000)) and in the
risk management industry. Similar to that of banks, we define the state of firm ℓ as
being either solvent (µℓ(t) = 0) or defaulted on its’ loans to banks (µℓ(t) = 1). Fur-
thermore, firms are classified according to their creditworthiness, which is quan-
tified by a probability of default PDℓ(t) ∈ (0, 1), for firm ℓ at time t. All firms
fall into one of two categories: (i) investment-grade (IG) or (ii) non-investment /
speculative grade (NIG). The probability of default PDη
ℓ
(t) for firm ℓ (of grade η)
at time t is given by
PDη
ℓ
(t) = Rℓ(η) + µG + ψ

∑
i∈WD
ℓ
φi(t) +
∑
i∈WI
ℓ
φi(t)
 , (9)
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where Rℓ(η) ∈ (0, 1) is drawn from the distribution of ρη(PD) for firms in grade η.
The second term µG reflects an aggregate economy wide shock to all firms. The
final term in the equation above reflect the macro-feedback loop. The indicator
variable φi(t) denotes whether bank i’s intent to perform a firesale (φi(t) = 1) or
abstain (φi(t) = 0) from such drastic action. If bank i is forced to perform a firesale,
the action is accompanied by the bank cutting back on its lending to firms. This
act leaves firms more vulnerable to default, thereby resulting in an increase of their
PD by an amount ψ. Thus for each bank (domestic and international) performing
a firesale, against whom firm ℓ has borrowed (denoted by the set WX
ℓ
= {i ∈
NX | ciℓ = 1}), there will be a contribution ψ increase to the firms’ PD.
Firms default according to a series of Bernoulli trials, i.e., starting with all
firms being solvent, at specific times t⋆, each firm ℓ will default independently of
others with probability PDη
ℓ
(t⋆). These times t⋆ occur each time the PDs of firms
are incremented by factors of ψ due to the firesales and subsequent cutting back of
lending by the banks.
Default severs the connections (loans and shares) between banks and firms.
We assume a zero recovery rate for loans and also suppose that share prices of the
defaulted firms drop to zero.10 Thus, losses from firms for bank i are:
Li,f(t) =
∑
j∈NFi
S i j µ j(t) +
∑
j∈MFi
Ti j µ j(t) . (10)
Bank i will default at time t from the firm credit shocks if Li,f(t) > Ki.
Contagion in the financial system may spread through direct financial linkages.
If bank i defaults, then another bank j holding assets against bank i, will suffer
losses. At this point, we assume that the financial counterparties of defaulting
banks lose all of their interbank assets held against that bank.11 At time t the
counter-party losses for bank j amount to
L j,c(t) =
∑
k ∈ NDj
S jk ηk(t) +
∑
k∈N Ij
S jk ηk(t) . (11)
Contagion may also spread indirectly as a result of mark-to-market losses on
balance sheets brought on by fire sales of assets by banks in distress. As any
10The stylized zero recovery rate assumption simplifies the mathematical structure of the model.
And, though we adopt it in our simulations, the framework allows for this assumption to be relaxed
in a straightforward manner.
11This assumption is likely to be realistic in the midst of a crisis: in the immediate aftermath of a
default, the recovery rate on loans and the timing of economic recovery will be highly uncertain and
those providing banks’ funding are likely to assume the worst-case scenario. Gai and Kapadia (2010)
show that the qualitative features of these types of model are robust to relaxing this assumption.
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individual bank incurs losses, it is likely to take defensive actions to protect itself
from failure. One option, exercised by some institutions since the advent of the
current financial crisis, is for the bank to sell assets. Therefore, we allow banks to
sell equities when they are in distress (we suppose that debt is completely illiquid
and therefore cannot be sold). Specifically, banks engage in fire sales of equities
once losses mount above a certain fraction α ∈ (0, 1) of their capital, i.e.,
φ j(t) = Θ
(
L j,c(t) + L j,f(t) − αK j
)
. (12)
Let Q(t) ≥ 0 be the equity held by banks participating in a fire sale at time t,
i.e.,
Q(t) =
∑
i∈ND
φi(t)

∑
ℓ∈MF
Tiℓ
 +
∑
i∈N I
φi(t)

∑
ℓ∈MF
Tiℓ
 , (13)
and Q > 0 be the total equity held by all banks. The dynamics of the equity price,
q(t) ≥ 0, are determined by a form of “cash in the market” pricing (Allen and
Gale (2005); Cifuentes et.al (2005)), where the price is reducing in the ratio of
the equities for sale to the quantity of equities not being sold, a proxy for non-
distressed potential buyers. We therefore write
q(t + 1) = q(t)
(
1 − λ Q(t)Q − Q(t)
)
, (14)
where λ ∈ R+ is a parameter that measures the price impact of a fire sale.12 If
the market is extremely liquid, λ = 0 and there is no price impact from asset
sales, whereas λ > 0 implies that equity prices fall sharply for a given amount of
distressed assets on the market.
When the equity price falls, banks incur mark-to-market losses on their equity
holdings. Bank j′s total losses at time t are thus given by
L j,tot(t) = L j,c(t) + L j,f +
∑
k ∈MF
T j k (q(0) − q(t)) [1 − µk(t)] . (15)
where the last term refers to losses incurred due to a fall in equity prices of firms
that did not default from the initial shock.
When one bank has defaulted, related counterparty and mark-to-market losses
may cause other banks to default. This process continues iteratively, with contin-
12While the prescribed form of equity price captures an acceleration in price fall as more equity is
dumped onto the market, we must explicitly demand that negative prices are not allowed. This may
be achieved by multiplying the right-hand side of (14) by Θ(q(t)).
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ually updating counterparty and mark-to-market losses, until no further banks are
pushed into default.13
B. Principle of maximum entropy
Let us define P(X) to be the probability distribution for the random variable
X ∈ N. We shall, for the moment concentrate on the case of discrete random vari-
ables, but the theory may be readily generalized to the case of continuous random
variables.
Suppose we can observe and empirically measure the first M raw moments of
the distribution, which we write as
µn =
∑
x≥0
xnP(X = x) , n = 0, 1, . . . , M . (16)
The n = 0 case simply reflect that the probability distribution must be normalized,
i.e., µ0 = 1.
Our goal is to find the least biased form for P(x) that satisfies the constraints
give by Eq. (16). The principle of maximum entropy states that the distribution
we seek is the one that maximizes the information entropy. We can solve for this
distribution from the Lagrange function
S [P] = −
∑
x≥0
P(x) log P(x) +
M∑
n=0
λn
[∑
x≥0
xnP(X = x)
]
, (17)
where the λn ∈ R indicate the Lagrange multipliers that we must solve for. The
first term in Eq. (17) gives us the information entropy. Our maximal entropy
distribution is given by solving ∂S [P]/∂P(x) = 0, which yields
P(x) = exp
(
− [λ0 + λ1 x + λ2 x2 + . . . + λM xM]
)
, (18)
where
λ0 = log Z
= log
∑
x≥0
exp
(
− [λ0 + λ1 〈x〉 + λ2 〈x2〉 + . . . + λM 〈xM〉]
)
(19)
13Eisenberg and Noe (2001) demonstrate that, following an initial default in such a system, a
unique vector which clears the obligations of all parties exists.
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enforces the normalization of the probability distribution and the Lagrange multi-
pliers are given as the solutions to the set of M + 1 equations
µn =
∫
dx xn exp
(
−
M∑
m=0
λm xm
)
, n = 0, 1, . . . M . (20)
Closed form analytical expressions for the distributions are available only when
M ≤ 2. For M = 0, we only specify that the probability distribution must be nor-
malized. This corresponds to Laplace’s principle of indifference, which dictates
that if we have no prior information to distinguish between different states of a
system we must associate equal probability to each state. For M = 1, we impose
that the distribution must be normalized and specify its’ mean. If the mean is posi-
tive then we get an exponential distribution. Finally, when M = 2 and the support
for the random variable is the entire real axis, we obtain the Normal distribution
function. For higher values of M there is no closed for analytical expression and
we must rely on numerical methods to solve for the distribution. In particular, we
follow the method proposed by Mohammad-Djafari (1991) for the estimation.
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Figure 1: The stylized financial system where the filled circles - nodes - represent banks/firms, and
the links between nodes depict credit or equity relationships. There are three distinct layers: (i) a
core of domestic banks, (ii) a peripheral layer of international banks and (iii) an outer layer of firms.
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Figure 2: Typical balance sheet of a bank in the financial system.
30
Figure 3: Structure of the model.
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Figure 4: Empirical distributions (circles) for the inter-bank asset sizes on a Y-logarithmic axis, i.e., the probability has a logarithmic scale. We plot
against the empirical distribution both the maximum-entropy distribution (solid line) and the fitted log-normal distribution (dashed line).
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Figure 5: The small world nature of international financial interlinkages. Starting with a regular
lattice where each bank is connected to its’ two nearest-neighbor banks (one on either side), we add
‘long range’ links at random (with probability p) between banks to get the small-world network.
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Figure 6: Distribution of losses relative to system assets for the entire banking network (red) and
the UK banking network (blue) for the baseline scenario. In the inset we show the corresponding
normalized histogram for the number of defaulted firms.
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Figure 7: The average fraction of failed banks as a function of the aggregate macroeconomic shock,
µG. The initial instance of total system breakdown is indicated by the downward facing triangle.
The dashed line represents the case with ψ = 6.25 × 10−5 and λ = 0.0. The upward facing triangle
indicates the corresponding first instance of total breakdown.
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Figure 8: Loss distributions for the stressed aggregate macroeconomic shock scenario where µG =
0.078.
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Figure 9: The average fraction of failed banks as a function of µG. The black line represents the cases
where λ = 0.7 and ψ = 0.0. The downward facing triangle indicates the first instance of total system
breakdown. The dashed-blue line is for λ = 0.7 and ψ = 6.25 × 10−5. The upward facing triangle
indicates the first instance of total breakdown for these parameters.
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Figure 10: The average fraction of failed banks as a function of µG, where λ = 0.7, ψ = 6.25 × 10−5
and π is random and uniformly distributed in the interval [0.4, 0.24].
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